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firms. Without imposition of the symmetry condition, mon-
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price equilibrium under the Blanchard-Kiyotaki setup. While
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New Keynesian paradoxes in zero lower bound circumstances.
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2I. Introduction
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), now more than three decades old, was
one of the first papers in Keynesian reconstruction efforts in the DSGE
framework. Even though the framework that it adopted is now becoming
deprecated, there still are some traces of influence left in modern New Key-
nesian literature - for example, see Woodford (2003) and Gal´ı (2015).
We argue that some of the conclusions in Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987)
that inspired later New Keynesian reconstruction efforts are not fully sup-
ported. The issue this paper raises is the symmetry condition assumed to
get a unique flexible-price equilibrium in the Blanchard-Kiyotaki model. Ini-
tially, the condition seems innocuous, but more scrutiny reveals that it is
not.
Thus, the re-assessment of the Blanchard-Kiyotaki model, despite becom-
ing deprecated, has some relevance in modern macroeconomics methodology.
In monopolistic competition models, the symmetry condition argument still
is used to prune out some of possible equilibria. If the symmetry condition is
not justified, then while this does not require a fundamental change of mod-
ern macroeconomics, a few conclusions coming from some models would be
overturned. Furthermore, multiple equilibria and monetary non-neutrality
are much more common than usually considered.
II. Analysis of the flexible-price Blanchard-Kiyotaki model
The point behind imposing the symmetry condition is that when firms and
households are identical in their characterizations, then their equilibrium
values must be the same. That is, their production Yi must be equal such
that Yi = Y ∀i, price Pi = P ∀i.
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This point seems obviously true and innocuous. But we argue that iden-
tical characterizations do not mean equilibrium outcomes are identical.
Let us state the simplified flexible-price Blanchard-Kiyotaki model. For
convenience, we assume that an economy is deterministic, but conclusions
of analysis here applies to stochastic cases without loss of generality.
The representative consumer has utility function U that it maximizes:
(1) U =
∞∑
t=0
βt
(
Ct
1−σ
1− σ
−
Nt
1+ϕ
1 + ϕ
)
where β is time preference discount factor, Ct is consumption, Nt is labor
utilized. It is subject to the budget constraint:
(2) PtCt +
Bt
1 + it
≤ WtNt + Ft +Bt−1
where Pt is price level, Bt is central bank-issued bonds, it is nominal interest
rate set on Bt, Wt is wage, and Ft is dividends paid from firms.
There is monopolistic competition in an economy - we apply the standard
CES toolkit, such that:
(3) Ct ≡
(∫ 1
0
Cit
ε−1
ε di
) ε
ε−1
where Cit is consumption of goods at firm i. Price level Pt is defined such
that PtCt =
∫ 1
0
PitCit di. In equilibrium, Yt = Ct and Cit = Yit, and thus
from now on, we will use Y and C interchangeably.
The resulting price level and demand function for Yit are:
(4) Pt =
(∫ 1
0
P 1−εit di
) 1
1−ε
4(5) Yit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−ε
Yt
Now specification of firms. Firms are assumed to utilize homogeneous labor,
its only production factor, such that wage level must be same across firms.
Firms have production function:
(6) Yit = AtN
1−α
it
with
∫ 1
0
Nit di = Nt. Firms maximize profits Ft, which are all given out as
dividends:
(7) Ft = PitYit −WtNit
Each firm selects Pit to maximize profit, given its demand function for Yit.
Since firm i is considered of negligible size, we assume that change of Pit
does not affect Pt and Yt. Firms take Wt as given.
The profit maximization solution says that:
Pit =
ε
ε− 1
MCt
=
ε
ε− 1
1
1− α
Wt
At
1/(1−α)
Yit
α
1−α
=
ε
ε− 1
1
1− α
Wt
At
1/(1−α)
[(
Pit
Pt
)−ε
Yt
] α
1−α
(8)
whereMCt refers to marginal cost, when total cost isWtNit = Wt(Yit/At)
1/(1−α).
Thus,
(9) (Pit)
1+ εα
1−α =
ε
ε− 1
1
1− α
Wt
At
1/(1−α)
(Pt)
εα
1−α (Yt)
α
1−α
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Because we assumed Pt and Yt are not changed by individual firm decisions
due to firm size being negligible, Equation (9) suggests that every firm must
have the same equilibrium, even if we do not impose the symmetry condition
externally.
But is this really correct assessment?
There are two things to note. First, in this economy, number of firms
are infinite. Second, before we get an equilibrium, there is possibility that
Pit affects Pt or Yit affects Yt if its value reaches infinity. The question is
whether we can really eliminate such an equilibrium.
One may say, “why not?” After all, infinity results are nonsense. But
remember that this is an infinite-number-of-firms economy, and no one really
thinks that there are realistically infinite number of firms. We only do it
for model tractability. Thus we need to deal with a finite-number-of-firms
economy, and then consider back the infinite-number-of-firms economy.
Change Equation (3) to be:
(10) Ct ≡
(∑
i
C
ε−1
ε
it
) ε
ε−1
Price level Pt, defined with PtCt =
∑
i PitCit, is:
(11) Pt =
(∑
i
P 1−εit
) 1
1−ε
and demand function for firm i is as in Equation (5):
Yit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−ε
Yt
6A. Why multiple equilibria prevail
Now the intuition is clear: because Yt and Pt are now each affected by
Yit and Pit, Pit does depend on value of Yit in the solution of the profit
maximization problem, unlike Equation (9). Thus, there will be multiple
equilibria.
Firm i’s price-setting function would be, substituting wage demand (labour
supply) function coming from the consumer optimization problem and pro-
duction function:
(12) Pit = ft(Yit, {Yjt}j 6=i, {Pj}j 6=i)
where ft refers to a function. Recall the demand function for firm i in
Equation (5):
Yit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−ε
Yt
There are 2n − 1 equations when there are n firms - n − 1 equations from
Equation (12) and n equations from Equation (5)) - having set one of Pit
to be 1 or some constant value. There are 2n variables - n− 1 instances of
Pit, n instances of Yit and Yt.
Pt is determined from {Pit}. Yt can be determined from {Yit}, but if we
substitute Yt with Equation (10), then since Yit ∈ {Yit} and given the form
of Equation (10), we would not be able to write the demand function in
form of:
Yit = gt({Pjt}, {Yjt}j 6=i)
Furthermore, by construction, Equation (11) and Equation (5) replicate
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Equation (10). The proof goes as follows:
Ct = (PtCt)Pt
ε−1


(∑
i
P 1−εit
) 1
1−ε


−ε
= (PtCt)Pt
ε−1
(∑
i
P 1−εit
) ε
ε−1
=
[∑
i
(
P−εit PtCtP
ε−1
t
) ε−1
ε
] ε
ε−1
=

∑
i
([
Pit
Pt
]−ε
Ct
) ε−1
ε


ε
ε−1
=
[∑
i
C
ε−1
ε
it
] ε
ε−1
(13)
The first line in Equation (13) follows from the definition of Pt in Equation
(11). The second, third and fourth line are tautological. The fifth line
follows from Equation (5).
Thus there are multiple equilibria, since there are only 2n − 1 equations
for 2n variables.
B. A unique symmetric equilibrium
We now consider the case when equilibrium variables of firms are assumed
to be symmetric (identical).
Instead of writing as Equation (12), price-setting function may be written
instead as, having substituted production function:
(14)
Wt
Pt
= ht(Yt)
8where ht refers to a function. Equation (14) does not have the wage demand
(labour supply) function substituted.
The wage demand (labour supply) function now needs to be stated, having
substituted production function:
(15)
Wt
Pt
= ηt(Yt)
where ηt refers to a function. The interaction of wage demand and supply
function interacts to allow for possibility of a unique symmetric equilibrium
- given value of Pt, we can obtain Wt and Yt (two variables) from these two
equations.
C. Summary: multiple equilibria unless the symmetry condition
Thus, the symmetry condition has to be externally imposed in a finite-
number-of-firms economy in order to secure possibility of a unique equi-
librium. Otherwise, we generally have multiple equilibria. But since the
symmetry condition cannot be derived, its justification is weak. We revisit
the justification issue soon.
In the infinite-number-of-firms limit, it is true that asymmetry has to be
extreme (infinite) for an equilibrium other than a unique symmetric equi-
librium. However, it is still true that these perverse equilibria are not elim-
inated. We have to eliminate the perverse equilibria by imposing the no-
infinity condition or the symmetry condition. Again, one must consider the
point that no one really thinks an economy has infinitely many firms.
VOL. NO. SYMMETRY CONDITION AND BLANCHARD-KIYOTAKI 9
D. Justification for the symmetry condition?
One may still argue that the symmetry condition is justified. After all,
firms are same in their characterizations! Would not firms then have to face
the same circumstance?
But the point is that firms are not really the same. After all, the point
of monopolistic competition is that each firm has something different from
others - the reason why it gets limited monopoly power or price setting
power. Even when production function is the same, products from different
firms are not identical, despite math possibly not clearly identifying this
fact.
E. Monetary (non-)neutrality
As matter of monetary neutrality goes, if we restrict to single-period anal-
ysis, there is still not much monetary policy can do, and monetary neutrality
holds, despite equilibrium non-uniqueness.
However, when we move onto multiple-period analysis, where nominal
interest rate it comes to make sense, circumstances do change. This can
be seen in the canonical New Keynesian Euler equation, derived from the
consumer optimization problem of our simplified Blanchard-Kiyotaki model,
which is shared in both the flexible and sticky price case:
(16)
(
Yt
Yt+1
)−σ
= β(1 + it)
Pt
Pt+1
Now central bank can affect an economy by affecting growth of Yt through
it. Thus there is monetary non-neutrality.
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III. Conclusion
This paper re-assessed the Blanchard-Kiyotaki framework - its methods
and assumptions. While the framework is becoming deprecated even in
macroeconomic literature, there are still some traces of the framework left.
For example, one may say that the conclusion of Blanchard and Kiyotaki
(1987) that frictions, such as sticky price, are needed to generate monetary
non-neutrality still provides intuitive benchmark assessment in New Keyne-
sian economics that the optimal goal of monetary policy is about reducing
impacts of frictions to an otherwise frictionless economy.
What was shown is that once we carefully examine the finite-number-of-
firms circumstances and justifications behind the symmetry condition, the
conventional assessments of the Blanchard-Kiyotaki model are not justified.
Multiple equilibria prevail, and due to the consumption Euler equation,
monetary non-neutrality is there in the flexible-price Blanchard-Kiyotaki
model. This supports the general assessment that multiple equilibria and
monetary non-neutrality are much more common in a monopolistic compe-
tition world, even when not affected by frictions, in contrast to a perfect
competition world.
In terms of understanding New Keynesian paradoxes in zero lower bound
(ZLB), especially the ones about the flexible-price limit of sticky price
economies not converging toward actual flexible-price economy - see Werning
(2012), Kiley (2016) and Cochrane (2017) - this paper suggests that para-
doxes may actually partially come from the underlying flexible-price model.
Thus we have to reconsider validity of the paradoxes - more specifically, in
what class of models do the paradoxes still exist?
Monetary policy more generally may not just be about correcting frictions,
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but also about choosing a baseline frictionless equilibrium.
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